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MAKING METHOD VISIBLE: 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF 
SCIENCE-BASED REGULATION 
Pasky Pascual,* Wendy Wagner** & Elizabeth Fisher*** 
Scientific inferences are theories about how the world works that scientists 
formulate based on their observations. One of the most difficult issues at the  
intersection of law and science is to determine whether the weight of evidence 
supports one scientific inference versus other competing interpretations of the  
observations. In administrative law, this difficulty is exacerbated by the behavior 
of both the courts and regulatory agencies. Agencies seldom achieve the requisite 
visibility that explains the analytical methods they use to reach their scientific  
inferences. Courts—because they appreciate neither the variety of inferential 
methods nor their epistemic foundations—do not demand this level of visibility 
from the agencies. 
We argue that much progress can be made toward visible, coherent, science-
based regulations if courts ask two deceptively simple questions: (1) have the 
agency’s inferential methods been identified? and (2) does the agency explain 
how its methods are appropriate to the information on hand and how the  
methods support the agency’s inferences? 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, hours after the Ernsts dined at the Olive Garden restaurant 
where they first dated, Robert—exercise fanatic, triathlete, marathon  
runner—died of an apparent heart attack.1 “It didn’t make sense to me that 
he could have died like that from a heart problem,” said his wife, Carol.2 
Scouring the Internet, she discovered that Vioxx, the painkilling drug her 
husband had started taking, might be linked to cardiac arrest.3 She filed suit 
against Merck & Co., makers of Vioxx. After the jury awarded Carol more 
than $250 million in damages,4 Merck’s defense team insisted the company 
acted responsibly “from researching Vioxx prior to approval in clinical 
trials . . . to monitoring the medicine while it was on the market, to  
voluntarily withdrawing the medicine when it did.”5 Yet even with these 
precautions, a scientist at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)  
estimated that Vioxx caused roughly 55,000 deaths after the FDA approved 
it for market.6 
Unfortunately, the deaths from Vioxx are only one example of how 
drugs that have been approved by the FDA may nevertheless lead to unex-
                                                                                                                      
 1. Alex Berenson, In First of Many Vioxx Cases, a Texas Widow Prepares to Take the 
Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at C1. 
 2. Kevin McCoy, Merck to Face First Vioxx Trial Before Texas Jury Next Month, USA 
TODAY (June 29, 2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/ 
2005-06-29-vioxx-cover-usat_x.htm. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The trial court’s judgment was reversed on appeal. Merck v. Ernst, 296 S.W.3d 81 
(Tex. App. Houston 2009), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1980 (2012). 
 5. Marc Kaufman, Merck Found Liable in Vioxx Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 
A01. 
 6. Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Failing in Drug Safety, Official Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2004, at A1 (based on Dr. David Graham’s testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, 
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf).  
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pected deaths, sometimes at considerable levels. Indeed, researchers esti-
mate that roughly one out of every five FDA-approved drugs are likely to 
be linked to serious adverse side effects,7 risks that were not detected during 
the $1 billion-plus testing and oversight of each drug that is required for 
FDA approval.8 The conventional explanation offered for this alarming gap 
in public health protection is that the clinical trials cannot detect all of the 
potential adverse effects due to the small size of the tested populations.9 
While this may be partially true, we maintain that the FDA’s failure to flag 
the link between Vioxx and the risk of cardiac arrests stemmed from a fun-
damental misunderstanding of the methods of scientific inference, which 
might have been avoided if these methods had been more visible to the 
regulatory community—including agencies, regulated entities, non-
governmental organizations who serve as watchdogs over regulations, and 
the courts. 
Scientific inferences are theories about how the world works, which  
scientists formulate on the basis of their observations.10 Such inferences are 
inevitably replete with uncertainties. Alternative theories can explain the 
same set of observations. Moreover, observations can often be incomplete 
and can sometimes be imprecise or inaccurate. Scientists must therefore 
rely on various analytical methods to evaluate the concordance between 
observations and the competing theories used to explain them.11 We argue 
that the FDA promulgated only one among these various methods as the 
evidentiary standard to evaluate drug risk. Once it did so, this method 
evolved into a regulatory process—unexamined, unquestioned, and for the 
most part, invisible to the regulatory community—regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See, e.g., Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals 
for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002) (estimating that 20 percent of all 
new drugs are likely to have serious or life-threatening adverse effects within the first 
twenty-five years of use that will either be unknown or undisclosed at the time of drug 
approval). It has also been estimated that 250,000 adverse drug experiences (ADEs), i.e., 
adverse events that occur when drugs are used in professional practice, are reported to the 
FDA each year. It has been further estimated that costs associated with ADE-related mortal-
ity and morbidity exceed $75 billion annually and that ADEs are among the top ten causes 
of death. Syed Rizwanuddin Ahmad, Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2003). 
 8. See, e.g., Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 205 (2010), available 
at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v9/n3/full/nrd3078.html (discussing the high costs of 
drug testing). 
 9. See, e.g., Lasser et al., supra note 7, at 2218 (concluding that adverse effects appear 
for new drugs because “[p]remarketing drug trials are often underpowered to detect ADRs, 
and have limited follow-up”). 
 10. RAY HILBORN & MARC MANGEL, THE ECOLOGICAL DETECTIVE: CONFRONTING 
MODELS WITH DATA 12 (1997). 
 11. Id. 
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this particular method was suitable to the observations on hand.12 Indeed, 
with the benefit of hindsight from Vioxx, Congress in 2007 passed legisla-
tion to amend the FDA’s incomplete approach and to provide the FDA 
with the authority to establish the infrastructure needed to collect observa-
tions that lend themselves to a broader set of inferential methods.13 
The problems with the FDA’s drug approval program before the 2007 
legislation, as well as other problems in areas of environmental and health 
regulation, arose from a very simple but unappreciated problem—the fail-
ure to make methods visible as part of the regulatory process. The visibility 
we prescribe amounts to little more than requiring agencies to explicate and 
justify the choice of one inferential model over another. Rarely do agencies 
compare, explain, or justify these inferential techniques when synthesizing 
the scientific evidence that serves as the basis for regulatory decisions. As 
the Vioxx case and many other unfortunate regulatory fallouts attest, how-
ever, the consequences of hidden inferential methods can be potentially 
significant. As long as the basis for science-intensive regulatory decisions is 
obscure, the potential for errors and incomplete analyses on fundamental 
decisions such as risk prevention remains unnecessarily high. 
Visible methods open up an agency’s decisionmaking to scrutiny, both 
internal and external, in a way that would not be possible otherwise. Once 
agency staff are expected to make their methods visible, such methods 
would not be made implicitly or by default, or without a careful considera-
tion of alternatives. Perhaps more importantly, requiring methods to be 
visible would shift the courts’ oversight role toward insisting on explana-
tions rather than evaluating individual agency choices themselves, except 
with respect to their fit within the statutory frame. Finally, visible methods 
would refocus the full range of regulatory participants on the methodologi-
cal choices available and the importance of selecting the best inferential 
methods for the task at hand. In short, making methods visible highlights 
the “means” of the decisionmaking or how inferences are derived from data, 
rather than on the outcomes or “ends” of regulatory deliberations.  
While these methods of scientific inference may seem far outside the 
domain of most lawyers, we argue that the legal system in general and the 
courts in particular are partly to blame for the deficiencies in the agencies’ 
lack of methodological transparency. The process of judicial review has not 
only been complicit in allowing the agencies’ methods of inferring risks and 
synthesizing evidence to fall out of sight, but has actually aggravated the 
tendency by making methods largely irrelevant to the basic mechanisms 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. Food And Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823. 
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used to hold agencies accountable.14 What is worse, when decisionmakers do 
develop detailed, visible methods, the legal system provides little reward or 
encouragement for such efforts. If anything, contemporary statutory  
requirements and mechanisms for judicial review can actually serve to  
penalize this methodological candor through misguided second-guessing.15  
Of even greater concern, there is virtually no debate within legal arenas 
about the nature and importance of methods of scientific inference. Few 
lawyers will have ever thought about the methods by which scientific find-
ings are inferred from data.16 Lawyers have instead treated scientific 
analysis as a “truth machine”17 which produces answers but they have not 
felt the need to scrutinize how the machine actually works. Frameworks 
such as “risk assessment”18 might give the appearance of a method, but in 
fact are merely general decisionmaking frameworks derived from concerns 
over administrative legitimacy19 and imposed upon regulatory science as 
part of the administrative process. To use an analogy, it is as if the work of 
common law courts were simply understood in terms of the results of  
decided cases rather than the reasoning deployed by judges. To do this is to 
miss a significant aspect of the legal method; as lawyers, we not only focus 
on judicial method, but also see the visibility of such method as a virtue of 
judicial reasoning. A judgment that provides no reasoning or provides 
reasoning that is opaque is problematic, and there is a rich discourse about 
the nature and quality of legal methods.20 All the same is true in relation to 
methods of inference in science.  
Once the methods are made visible, scientists, policymakers, and inter-
ested participants will be forced to grapple with identifying the most robust 
                                                                                                                      
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. There are notable exceptions, however. See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, A Fitting Vision of 
Science for the Courtroom, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (Rutgers Sch. of 
Law-Newark, Paper No. 118, 2012) (arguing that in reviewing the admissibility of expert 
weight of the evidence testimony under Daubert, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Milward rightly demanded rigorous explanations and methods to support the experts’ 
inferences, rather than direct testing), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2101454. 
 17. Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding Models in 
Environmental and Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENV. L.J. 293 passim (2010). 
 18. COMM. ON THE INST. MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING 
THE PROCESS (1983), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=366&page=1. 
 19. ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
ch. 3 (2007). 
 20. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1991); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968). Judicial reasoning has been a major schol-
arly focus in the area of risk regulation. See Richard B. Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk 
Management, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10208 (1986); Patricia Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts 
Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 636–39 (1994).  
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and comprehensive approaches to inference. While deconstruction and 
ends-oriented attacks against methods remain fair game, they become a 
much more difficult means of sabotage as long as critics are expected to 
point to uniformly superior approaches that could replace the methodologi-
cal flaws they attack. By making methods visible, the regulatory apparatus 
also becomes more conditioned to finding ways to remain updated and to 
evolve with improved methods. The agencies’ focus shifts towards develop-
ing the best methods, not simply developing scientific outputs that are 
presented strategically in ways intended to navigate around possible  
legal and political controversies and lines of attack. 
We do not pretend that making methods visible is a magic wand  
solution to ossification,21 the manufacturing of scientific uncertainty,22 or 
analytical opportunism on the part of litigants, however.23 By drawing the 
focus to how scientists draw inferences from the data, lawyers are focusing 
on the most fundamental element in the rigor of science-intensive adminis-
trative decisionmaking. While we could be accused of having little 
awareness of how science can be socially constructed and framed,24 such a 
criticism neglects the crux of our argument; namely, that methods need to 
be made more visible in the regulatory process, not more authoritative.25 As 
Bruno Latour has remarked, the key problem in contemporary science 
debates today is not so much that we have an “excessive confidence in ideo-
logical arguments posturing as matters of fact”—dismantling regulatory 
science seems to be routine—but that instead we have “an excessive distrust 
of good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases.”26 Making  
method visible is thus not about uncovering a ‘truth machine’ but about 
ensuring that a discourse takes place about what are the methods best suited 
for the particular factual questions that underpin a specific regulatory  
decision in an area in which there are limits to scientific knowledge.  
Our overarching argument that risk regulation would be considerably 
improved—on all levels—by making methods visible is developed in three 
parts. Part I provides a very particularized discussion of methods, explain-
                                                                                                                      
 21. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403 (1992). 
 22. See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S 
ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008). 
 23. FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
 24. The literature on this point is a rich one. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE 
BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN 
ACTION (1987).  
 25. See FISHER, supra note 19; Pasky Pascual, Wresting Environmental Decisions from an 
Uncertain World, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10539 (2005); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in 
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). 
 26. Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters 
of Concern, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY 225, 227 (2004). 
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ing what we mean by “methods”; of how scientists use a variety of methods 
to draw inferences from the available information; and of why scientific 
inferences can be justified only within the context of methods used to  
derive them. Many lawyers might be tempted to skip or skim this Part on 
the assumption that such scientific discussion is within neither their  
expertise nor domain.27 We would strongly urge readers not to do this, 
however; this Part lays bare some of the gaps that can arise when the  
methods of analysis are invisible, as they were in relation to the FDA  
approval of Vioxx. Part I concludes by discussing why the invisibility of 
methods has led regulatory agencies down the path toward inconsistent 
analyses of pesticide risks and untenable decisions regarding a variety of 
standards, benchmarks, and regulatory pronouncements. 
Part II considers why methods tend to be obscure in regulatory debates. 
As already noted above, we argue that currently very little method is actually 
made visible and that frameworks such as “risk assessment” and monikers 
such as “sound science” serve as effective black boxes that promote the 
invisibility of methods. This Part explores why such an inferior state of 
affairs is institutionally tolerated. 
Part III considers how methods should be made visible and then pro-
vides several illustrations on how this might be done. We argue that such 
visibility can serve a range of ends, but the most significant is improving 
the quality of regulatory decisionmaking. Making methods visible is  
important because it is about making the reasoning process visible so it can 
be assessed. This is particularly so in administrative law because reasoning 
and its rigor has always been the subject’s historical focus. We conclude the 
third Part by suggesting how courts can enhance the visibility of methods 
by rewarding agencies for this work.  
We should stress at the outset that this Article is part of a larger  
inquiry into the interface between science and law that we have been carrying 
out over the last few years.28 That interface has largely been characterized as 
an uneasy and even unviable collaboration.29 What we have been interested 
in doing is exploring how that relationship can be understood in a more 
constructive way. Making method visible is a necessary, albeit not the only 
step, needed to do this.  
                                                                                                                      
 27. Elizabeth Fisher et al., Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal and 
Regulatory Context, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 251 (2010) (critiquing that assumption). 
 28. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 17. 
 29. See, e.g., Devra Lee Davis, The Shotgun Wedding of Science and Law: Risk Assessment 
and Judicial Review, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 67, 68 (1985); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. 
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1255 (2004). 
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I. METHODS AND WHY THEY MATTER 
Regulatory crises such as the Vioxx tragedies, along with other  
unexpected adverse events associated with approved drugs, result in part 
from a tacit selection of methods at a particular point in time that outlasts 
the appropriate use of those methods in consequent regulatory decisions. 
Before discussing how methods matter to regulatory outcomes, however, we 
first discuss what we mean by methods of inference. There are not only 
choices between methods of inference, but several layers at which those 
choices consistently arise. Each level of choice, moreover, can impact  
regulatory outcomes, potentially exponentially. 
A. What Are the Methods of Scientific Inference? 
On one level, the Vioxx crisis stemmed from questions over a scientific 
fact—was the drug factually safe or not? Such questions accompany virtual-
ly all major public health and safety regulations: Does chloroform in 
drinking water pose risks at any concentration above zero?30 Does bisphenol 
A in baby bottles give rise to risks?31 Do greenhouse gases endanger public 
health and the environment?32 There has been much literature concerning 
how the question of safety is not just a factual question but also a value-
based one.33 That is true, but focusing on this ignores that underlying the 
factual aspects of these questions is a subtler, more fundamental scientific 
issue with significant, practical consequences; ultimately, disputes over facts 
have as much to do with disagreements over which methods establish the 
most believable and most scientifically trustworthy description of the  
data.34 
                                                                                                                      
 30. In Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court 
remanded EPA’s drinking water standard for chloroform of 0 parts per million because some 
evidence suggested there was a safe threshold for cancer risk. 
 31. The FDA ruled that baby bottles and children’s drinking cups could no longer 
contain BPA, although it did so based on the industry’s abandonment of BPA in the manu-
facture of those items. Indirect Food Additives: Polymers, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,899, 41,902 (July 
17, 2012) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 177). The FDA continues to study the safety risks 
of BPA. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BISPHENOL A (BPA): USE IN FOOD CONTACT APPLICATION, 
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm064437.htm (last updated 
Apr. 2, 2012). 
 32. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 33. E.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, BURYING UNCERTAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE 
AGAINST THE GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 27–102 (1993); Steven Rayner 
& Robin Cantor, How Fair Is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Societal Technology Choice, 
7 RISK ANALYSIS 3 (1987). 
 34. See M.P. Lynch, Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability, in SOCIAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 262, 262–64 (A. Haddock et al. eds., 2010). 
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Every rigorous discipline has methods that practitioners use to evaluate 
the quality of work conducted within their domain. Law is no exception. In 
countries practicing civil law, judges reach their decisions by applying a 
code of legal principles to the litigation at hand. Judges operating within a 
system of common law analyze the case history of past judicial opinions to 
reason their way to decisions.35 Without a jurisdiction’s shared understand-
ing of principles governing how to reach legal conclusions, there can be no 
agreement on whether judicial opinions should be trusted or believed.36  
While there has been a gradual acknowledgement within the law that 
scientific knowledge is distinguished by information that results from the 
deployment of a “scientific method,”37 much less discussed are the methods 
themselves—the epistemic principles—through which scientists draw infer-
ences from their data.38 One example of such inferential methods is the 
“aspects,” essentially qualitative causal assumptions, developed by Sir  
Austin Bradford Hill in 1965 to guide physicians in understanding the 
causal link between disease and environmental factors. Hill proposed several 
aspects for consideration: the strength or frequency of observed associa-
tions; consistency of association in varied circumstances; specificity of 
association; temporal relationship between disease and posited cause; the 
dose response curve between them; biological plausibility of the causal 
explanation; coherence of the explanation with aspects of the disease;  
experimental data; and existence of analogous causal relationships.39 Hill’s 
aspects have stood the test of time. They have been widely accepted by 
epidemiologists and toxicologists.40 They have also been used in numerous 
judicial opinions41 and agency regulations,42 despite the fact that no  
                                                                                                                      
 35. BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (6th ed. 2010). 
 36. This of course raises interesting and important questions about how foreign case 
law is used by courts. See Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign 
Law, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 59 (2009); Christopher McCrudden, Common Law of Human 
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 499 (2000). 
 37. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kitzmiller v. Dover 
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (referring broadly to a method in 
which explanations of natural phenomena are inferred from “confirmable data—the results 
obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scien-
tists”). 
 38. By “inference,” we mean conclusions about what the data are saying. All inferen-
tial methods are based on “first principles” which cannot be justified by a priori reasons. The 
global community of scientists has gravitated towards these principles because they have 
proven to be useful, to be relatively objective, to be rational, and they make reasoning visible. 
 39. A.B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED. 295, 295–99 (1965). 
 40. Gerard Swaen & Ludovic van Amelsvoort, A Weight of Evidence Approach to Causal 
Inference, 62 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 270, 270 (2009). 
 41. E.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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scientists use qualitative factors such as those used by Hill to infer relation-
ships between environmental and health harms and their causes. As to the 
former, scientists assume axioms so that they may formally apply computa-
tional approaches and quantitatively describe these relationships. Foremost 
among these axiom-based methods is probabilistic inference.43 We postpone 
our discussion of probabilistic inference until Part II. For now, we only note 
the existence of other axiomatic systems that are not probabilistic. For 
example, some commentators argue that long-term, complex systems, such 
as climate change and radioactive waste disposal, are so uncertain that their 
risks can only be estimated based on opinions elicited from experts in  
specific fields. These opinions are translated into numbers that can be  
synthesized and computed based on axioms other than those governing 
probability.44 
Three insights follow from Figure 1. First and most obvious, the meth-
ods of scientific inference are varied. Yet, despite this variety, only one type 
of method seems to garner the disproportionate attention of the regulatory 
process. This is the method of p-values, a type of probabilistic inference. In 
the words of one commentator, it is “the traditional measure of evidence, 
which I think is baked into every brick of regulatory buildings.”45 It is the 
method alluded to when there is an insistence upon “statistically significant” 
results before giving credence to scientific evidence.46  
Second, the methods outlined in Figure 1 are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, when scientists rely on multiple studies, conducted with multiple 
approaches, and the inferences derived from these studies converge around 
a coherent explanation of the relationship between harm and its suspected 
cause, the convergence is an indication of the strength of the evidence.  
Third, to draw reliable inferences, application of a method’s axioms 
should be appropriate to the data. As we discuss next, ignoring this truism 
contributed to the FDA’s undervaluation of the risks from Vioxx. 
                                                                                                                      
 43. For technical discussions of the variety of axiom-based, inferential methods, see 
George J. Klir & Richard M. Smith, On Measuring Uncertainty and Uncertainty-based Infor-
mation: Recent Developments, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
5 (2001) and Lofti A. Zadeh, Toward a Generalized Theory of Uncertainty (GTU)—an Outline, 
172 INFO. SCI. 1 (2005). 
 44. Scott Ferson et al., Summary from the Epistemic Uncertainty Workshop: Consensus 
amid Diversity, 85 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 355 (2004); Jon C. Helton et 
al., Representation of Analysis Results Involving Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty, 39 INT’L J. 
GEN. SYS. 605 (2010). 
 45. Steven N. Goodman, Introduction to Bayesian Methods I: Measuring the Strength of 
Evidence, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 282, 284 (2005). 
 46. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 148–
49 (D. Mass 2009). This decision was overturned on appeal, when the higher court acknowl-
edged a broader set of inferential methods should be acceptable in court. Milward, 639 F.3d 
at 23–25. 
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B. How Was FDA Constrained to Rely on the Method of P-values as Its 
Sole Method of Making Inferences? 
We return to the fate of Robert Ernst and the larger controversy  
surrounding the FDA’s approval of Vioxx. To the extent that weaknesses 
arose in the FDA’s program, they are suggestive of broader maladies across 
agencies. Indeed, in the case of the FDA and possibly other agencies as 
well, the narrow inferential frame was primarily if not exclusively the result 
of legislative design rather than agency choice.  
After considerable trial and error in drug regulation,47 Congress passed 
the 1962 amendments to the legislation governing drug regulation, which 
mandated that the FDA assess whether a drug was effective for its intended 
use based on “substantial evidence” from “adequate and well-controlled 
investigations.”48 This was the legislation in force during the FDA’s approval 
of Vioxx, and the FDA interpreted this statute to mean that a regulatory 
decision on drug effectiveness must be based on randomized, replicated, 
controlled, clinical trials (RCTs).49 In essence, RCTs serve as the idealized, 
traditional experiment in which experimental conditions are held constant 
and homogeneous, except for the causal factors under investigation (in this 
case, different levels of drug dose). It is this experimental design that justi-
fies using the method of p-values. 
The axioms of probability imply that (1) patterns in data about the  
natural world can be approximated by mathematical forms—probability 
distributions, of which the so-called “bell curve” is archetypical; and 
(2) these forms can be manipulated computationally in order to evaluate 
hypotheses about how the world operates.50 The method of p-values builds 
on these axioms, as we explain in Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                      
 47. For some of this history see CHARLES O. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG 
LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL (1970); GUSTAVUS A. WEBER, THE FOOD, DRUG AND 
INSECTICIDE ADMINISTRATION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION (1928); 
David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Sub-
stantive Contents, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939). 
 48. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(d), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006)). 
 49. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2012). The initial rules adopted by FDA have evolved over 
time, as described in Russell Katz, FDA: Evidentiary Standards for Drug Development and 
Approval, 1 NEURORX 307, 307–09 (2004). 
 50. See SCOTT M. LYNCH, INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED BAYESIAN STATISTICS AND 
ESTIMATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (2007) (discussing probability axioms, distributions, 
and their applications). 
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neous but for the causal factor being investigated.51 As explained in Figure 
2, it is this experimental design that justifies the initial assumption of a 
random, theoretical distribution, which serves as the basis for the p-value.  
But the very steps taken to preserve the experimental conditions  
demanded by the method of p-values ultimately led to the unregulated risks 
from Vioxx. To preserve homogeneity in the RCTs for Vioxx, Merck  
excluded older patients with previous cardiovascular disease.52 Yet, it was 
precisely this cohort that was later shown to be at greatest risk.53 Moreover, 
some of the variability causing differences in the response to Vioxx was 
observable only at the gene level.54 This complicated the extrapolation of 
RCT results to the general population. Finally, the incidence of heart  
disease from Vioxx in the greater population may have been so rare as not 
to have generated the low p-values needed for statistical significance. But 
the rarity of the event did not minimize the consequences of risk, as Robert 
Ernst’s tragedy demonstrated. 
Prior to the Vioxx incident, the fact that the FDA’s methods for drug 
approval were based on a limited inferential method was wholly invisible to 
most policymakers and many interested parties—including drug manufac-
turers—that, if asked, would likely have opted for a more comprehensive or 
a different form of assessment. Particularly since the FDA did not view 
itself as having much legislative choice, the methods it followed had well-
known blind spots and related limitations that seemed to be wholly ignored. 
Given the general invisibility of methods for inference across all agencies, 
this is not surprising. Indeed, having a debate about the strengths and 
weaknesses of inferential method, when such method is not visible and few 
regulatory actors recognize its importance is nigh on impossible. 
In hindsight, it is clear that the FDA need not have used an exclusive 
inferential method to evaluate drug risk. As shown in Figure 1, scientific 
inference typically proceeds down multiple paths. It was only after consid-
erable oversight hearings, scientific review, and agency self-reflection that a 
more comprehensive approach to scientific inference came to light for the 
FDA. Shortly after the Vioxx recall, the National Academy of Sciences’ 
(NAS) Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a report clearly stating what 
others had been saying for some time: the FDA’s pre- and post-approval 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See Steven N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 1: The P Value 
Fallacy, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 995 (1999). 
 52. James M. Ritter et al., Precaution, Cyclooxygenase Inhibition, and Cardiovascular Risk, 
30 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 503, 504 (2009). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Christine G. St Germaine et al., Genetic Polymorphisms and the Cardiovascular Risk 
of Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs, 105 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1740, 1740, 1743–44 
(2010). 
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practices were unlikely to detect rare but serious drug risks.55 Pre-approval, 
RCTs simply did not generate all the information needed to assess risks 
that arise when the general population is exposed to a drug.56 Post-approval, 
the FDA did not possess the statutory authorities needed to implement a 
nationwide system to gather this information.57 Indeed, the terms pre- and 
post-approval (or their synonyms, pre- and post-market) were not a useful 
construct to understand drug risks. In its stead, the IOM report advocated 
assessing safety over a drug’s life cycle, in which data were to be continu-
ously gathered from multiple sources for ongoing analyses.58 
In response to recommendations such as these, in 2007 Congress passed a 
statute that attempted to expand the FDA’s evidentiary base and to encour-
age the FDA to adopt additional methods of inference to help identify risks 
that might go undetected by traditional drug testing. First, Congress di-
rected the FDA to establish a network of data systems to integrate any and 
all information to evaluate drug risks.59 Second, Congress provided the 
FDA with new, extensive authorities to require post-market submission of 
this information.60 In interpreting these authorities, the FDA has stated 
that it can request this information if it will help assess serious drug risks, if 
it is unavailable in the FDA’s network of data systems, and if the request is 
based on scientific data the agency deems appropriate.61 The types of  
information that the FDA can request from drug manufacturers are far-
ranging: observational epidemiologic studies; electronic medical records 
and administrative health care claims; meta-analyses based on clinical trials 
or observational studies; and in vitro and in vivo laboratory studies involving 
animals.62 In brief, the evidentiary paradigm for the FDA’s drug evaluation 
now goes beyond any single study or RCT, however well designed, and 
integrates evidence generated across multiple investigations. 
The FDA’s 2007 legislation was a necessary, but far from sufficient, 
step toward coherent, science-based decisions. It prompted the FDA to 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, INST. OF 
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND 
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 37–38, 106–09 (A. Baciu et al., eds., 2007). 
 56. Id. at 37. 
 57. Id. at 153. 
 58. See id. at 169. 
 59. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§ 905, 121 Stat. 823, 944 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)–(4) (2006)). 
 60. Id. § 901(a), 121 Stat. at 922–26 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)–(p)). 
 61. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF 
SECTION 505(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances
/UCM172001.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 7–10. 
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assess drug risk using inferential methods beyond RCTs and p-values. 
However, as we stated earlier, scientific inferences are unavoidably uncer-
tain because observations are imperfect and because alternative theories can 
be used to explain identical sets of observations.63 The most challenging 
aspect of scientific inference—the challenge that lies at the intersection of 
law and science—is to determine which combination of data and methods 
best contributes to the weight of evidence supporting one inference versus 
other competing inferences.64 
As we discussed earlier, the scientific community relies on multiple  
inferential methods, with each method resting on its own particular set of 
epistemic foundations.65 Congress has neither the omniscience nor the 
competence to prescribe the appropriate method for every possible scenario 
requiring an evaluation of public health or environmental risks. 
What we suggest therefore is that, when agencies issue regulatory deci-
sions based on science, they must use inferential methods that are both 
pluralistic and visible. By “pluralistic,” we mean that agencies should openly 
recognize that their methods will vary, depending on the type of observa-
tions they are using to draw their inferences. By “visible,” we argue that 
agencies should explain why they have chosen particular methods and why 
these methods lead to the inferences being proposed by the agencies.66 
When agencies use pluralistic and visible methods, the regulatory commu-
nity is put into a better position to safeguard the rationality and thus the 
legality of regulatory decisions. 
Embracing a broader understanding of scientific inference67 need not 
lead us to the shoals of postmodern, or even post-normal,68 scientific rela-
tivism. The various methods summarized in Figure 1 must still be bound by 
the admonition raised by Latour that while historically we have had “exces-
sive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact,” 
scholars and regulatory actors now tend to have “an excessive distrust of 
good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases.”69 As that is the 
                                                                                                                      
 63. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 64. See Mark L. Taper & Subhash R. Lele, The Nature of Scientific Evidence: A Forward 
Looking Synthesis, in THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 527, 528–29 (Mark L. Taper & Subhash R. Lele eds., 
2004). 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 66. See infra text accompanying note 192. 
 67. Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, evinced such an 
understanding, saying scientists do “not limit the data they consider to the results of  
randomized clinical trials or to statistically significant evidence.” See Matrixx Initiatives Inc., 
v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1319–20 (2011).  
 68. See Silvio O. Funtowicz & Jerome R. Ravetz, Science for the Post-Normal Age, 25 
FUTURES 739, 739–40 (1993). 
 69. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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case, we need to focus not on whether something is true, but rather whether 
it is well or badly constructed.70 Are the inferences drawn by any particular 
inferential method, when set against epistemic first principles, well or badly 
constructed? These questions can only be answered if the methods are 
visible to the regulatory community.  
C. Invisible Methods in Practice 
The consequence of invisible methods was manifested in the Vioxx 
tragedies, but the problem and the resulting confusion and conflict run 
throughout a number of regulatory processes. This Section explores how 
the agencies’ failure to explicate methods of inference for their regulatory 
decisions can lead to confusion and controversy.  
1. Incorporating Methods into Pesticide Registration  
and Species Protection 
An ongoing conflict arising at the intersection of pesticide registrations 
and endangered species protection offers a particularly salient example of 
the regulatory conflict that can result from the agencies’ failure to make 
their methods visible.71 Currently the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reach very different 
conclusions from the data about the potential adverse impacts of pesticides, 
as illustrated in the text box below. Although their methods are invisible, 
lurking behind the agencies’ divergent choices of assumptions and models 
are very different statutory instructions for assessing risks. The FWS is 
tasked with preventing the extinction of endangered species, and when a 
species may be adversely affected by a federal activity, the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) requires the FWS to use the “best available” evidence in 
a way that gives the endangered species the benefit of the doubt.72 By con-
trast, in its regulatory assessment of a pesticide registration, the EPA is 
required to balance the benefits of a pesticide against its costs to human 
health and environment.73 This net balancing produces a much more open-
ended framework that does not afford species the benefit of the doubt. 
Instead, the species’ risks are compared against the benefits of the pesticide. 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Bruno Latour, An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”, 41 NEW LITERARY HIST. 
471, 474 (2010). 
 71. The nature of this controversy is summarized in BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. & 
TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STATEMENT OF TASK: ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
UNDER FIFRA AND ESA, http://dels.nas.edu/Study-In-Progress/Ecological-Risk-Assessment-
Under-FIFRA/DELS-BEST-11-01 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).  
 72. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2006). 
 73. EPA must ensure that the pesticide does not present “unreasonable adverse effects 
on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2006). 
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FIGURE 3. COMPARING FWS VS. EPA JUDGMENTS ON PESTICIDE 
RISKS TO ENDANGERED SPECIES74 
Questions Arising in the  
Scientific Analysis 
FWS’s Answers EPA’s Answers 
Should a study with 
methodological problems be 
excluded from the analysis? (e.g., 
what is the definition of “best 
available science”?) 
Not if part of the study does not 
suffer from the methodological 
problems and the findings of that 
part of the study suggest risks to 
endangered species. 
Yes. Standard exclusion criteria 
exclude studies that have 
methodological flaws that cause 
the studies to be unreliable. 
What types of endpoints in the 
studies
75
 should be considered? 
Sub-lethal, indirect and 
cumulative effects on species must 
be considered. 
Only endpoints that can be 
measured with some precision can 
be included in the analysis. 
How should the limited research 
on chemical mixtures be 
integrated into the analysis? 
The effects of chemical mixtures, 
as well as inactive ingredients, are 
critical to an assessment of risks 
to a species. 
There is so much variation in 
mixtures that they cannot be 
included in a reliable model. 
What types of assumptions should 
be included in the models when 
there is uncertainty about real 
world conditions? 
Liberal spray drift
76
 assumptions 
must be factored into an exposure 
model. 
Reasonable spray drift 
assumptions should be factored 
into an exposure model. 
How should the available on 
species’ range be integrated into 
the analysis? 
The species’ range should be 
measured by assuming the most 
expansive range. 
Population models need to adopt 
reasonable assumptions and 
require documentation for all 
assumptions. 
 
As Figure 3 reveals, there are important judgments at each point in the 
agencies’ synthesis of the literature on pesticide risks to endangered species. 
At the first step, the agency must determine which of the existing studies 
inform the regulatory project and which do not. While one might imagine 
                                                                                                                      
 74. These differences are drawn largely from BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. & TOXICOLOGY, 
supra note 71; from letters from EPA to NMFS regarding draft biological opinions on 
various pesticide decisions, see Letter from Debra Edward, Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs, 
to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected Res. 3–4 (Sept. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/effects/epa-to-nmfs.pdf; Letter from Richard P. Keigwin, 
Jr., Dir., Special Review and Reregistration Div., to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected 
Res. 2 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/11-18-08-nmfs-
biop.pdf; and from Telephone Interview conducted by Wendy Wagner with anonymous 
FWS Staff, Endangered Species Program (Jan. 26, 2012). 
 75. An endpoint is the adverse effect that a researcher measures in a toxicity study. 
Mortality is one of the most straightforward endpoints. Other endpoints include various 
measures of neurological effects (e.g., spontaneous locomotion of a mouse in an open field), 
tumors (e.g., benign and malignant), reproductive and development effects (e.g., brain 
weights of offspring at birth), etc. The challenge in toxicology is identifying one or more 
endpoints for a study that can be measured reliably. Behavioral change in animals, for 
example, is a much more difficult endpoint to measure as compared with mortality. 
 76. Spray drift refers to how far the pesticide sprays into the environment (and 
beyond the target) when it is applied. Spray drift is affected by a number of factors, including 
the contents of the pesticide product, its method of application, and wind speed. 
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that generic “exclusion/inclusion” criteria could be designed to sort out the 
available research, even decisions about how to use the literature depend on 
whether the agency seeks to afford every benefit of the doubt to the species 
or instead simply to produce a replicable, “mean” answer to a question. 
Choices also arise in identifying the parameters that will be used in a model. 
For example, what effects should be considered in predicting adverse  
impacts (e.g., sub-lethal effects or easily measured mortality) and what 
pesticides should be included (e.g., the entire chemical mix or one pesticide 
at a time)? Choices arise again in determining how to account for various 
scenarios, such as assumptions regarding spray drift, species’ range, and 
even the misuse of pesticides during application. All of these decisions are 
informed by scientific and technical judgments about plausible options, yet 
none is resolved by them. While Figure 3 extracts only a handful of these 
choices, in regulatory assessments there are often dozens. According to one 
classic NAS report, often as many as fifty significant choices can punctuate 
any given effort to characterize the risks of a product.77 
Although they are invisible, the agencies’ choice of methods profoundly 
affects their ultimate decisions. The EPA’s approach to synthesizing the 
literature often allows pesticide products to remain on the market with only 
limited restrictions; the FWS’s synthesis of the same scientific research, by 
contrast, leads to the opposite outcome.78 The resulting battles between the 
two agencies have sparked protracted and extensive litigation by interest 
                                                                                                                      
 77. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. 
HEALTH, supra note 18, at 29–33. 
 78. A review of the correspondence to date between FWS and EPA on individual 
pesticide decisions reveals credible and difficult technical disagreements over critical judg-
ments that should be used in making these assessments, with resulting implications for the 
ultimate pesticide licensing decisions. For example, FWS questions the viability of models 
used by EPA to estimate risks to endangered species or to calculate their ranges, see Letter 
from Marjorie Nelson, Chief, Branch of Consultation and HCPs, FWS, to Arthur-Jean B. 
Williams, Assoc. Dir., Envtl. Fate and Effects Div., Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA (Feb. 
11, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/endanger/litstatus/effects/atrazine/2008/ 
fws-nonconcur.pdf, and EPA questions the basis for various conclusions in the Biological 
Opinion about adverse effects resulting from the use of pesticide products. See, e.g., Letter 
from Stephen Bradbury, Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir., 
Office of Protected Res., NMFS, (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/ 
endanger/litstatus/effects/final-biop-ltr.pdf; Letter from Stephen Bradbury, Dir., Office of 
Pesticide Programs, EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected Res., NMFS (June 
14, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/endanger/litstatus/nmfs-draft-4-
1comment.pdf. Some progress has been made in bridging these different risk assessment 
approaches, however. In at least one set of pesticide reviews, EPA adjusted its registration 
requirements in accord with these agencies’ biological opinions. See Letter from Richard 
Keigwin, Special Review and Reregistration Div., EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of 
Protected Res., NMFS (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/ 
endanger/litstatus/11-18-08-nmfs-biop.pdf.  
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groups.79 Ultimately, the two agencies commissioned the NAS to serve as 
referee on the best way to synthesize the evidence at the intersection of 
pesticide approvals and endangered species protections.80 One of the first 
tasks of the NAS will be to draw out the various methodological steps of the 
analysis and then suggest how the agencies should best approach them, an 
exercise that ideally will produce a coherent and visible approach to merging 
the mandates. 
The material above demonstrates that methods of inference and how 
they relate to the statutory mandate are the source of the conflict, not  
differences in the underlying evidence or even the basic agency scientific 
assessments of that evidence. Specifically, because the methods that the 
agencies used to reach their judgments were obscured, the clashes appeared 
both more inconsistent and irreconcilable than they actually were. It is only 
when the agencies unpack their inference methods and other assumptions 
that the agencies’ analysis becomes accessible and can be compared across 
different programs that necessarily, by statute, deploy very different 
weighting factors for public policy. Many lawyers and policymakers, who 
have largely understood the scientific aspects of decisionmaking as a black 
box generating answers for the regulatory process, do not appreciate that 
fact, however.81 That gap in understanding only serves to further heighten 
the conflict and leave the core problem unresolved.  
2. Incorporating Methods into How Categories of Regulated 
Industries Are Defined  
Another, quite different example of the invisibility of methods in regu-
latory decisionmaking is the approach that agencies, primarily the EPA and 
OSHA, use to set technology-based standards for pollution control in air 
and water.82 The EPA in particular is instructed to identify a category of 
affected industries and to locate the best available pollution controls from 
within that set.83  
                                                                                                                      
 79. See, e.g., PESTICIDES: ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION PROGRAM, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/eslitig.htm (last updated May 9, 2012) (describing the 
ongoing litigation). 
 80. See the agencies’ charge to the NAS Committee examining ecological risk assess-
ment under FIFRA and ESA, BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. & TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCI., supra note 71. 
 81. A longer analysis of this problem can be found in Wagner et al., supra note 17. 
 82. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000).  
 83. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2006) (requiring that emissions from existing plants 
meet at least “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of 
the existing sources”). 
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Some industry groups discovered that one way to coax the EPA to lower 
the standards is to subdivide the industry into smaller and smaller catego-
ries. Steel manufacturers writ large might be required to install equipment 
to reduce pollution equivalent to that used by the top 5% of the performers 
in that sector; but if the EPA re-categorizes steel manufacturers into seven 
different subcategories, most of the top 5% performers in the subcategories 
may be much less successful in reducing pollution and the resulting pollution 
control standards can be significantly compromised in some and perhaps 
many of these subcategories.84  
This critical methodological step—identifying how the agency defined 
the larger set of affected industries—is rarely articulated or justified by the 
agency, however.85 As a result, the standards are largely immune to scrutiny. 
3. Incorporating Methods into Standards 
Other methodological choices used by agencies have similarly remained 
obscure in ways that undermine the accountability of the regulatory programs. 
One example is the EPA’s routine use of average adult susceptibilities to 
individual toxins to estimate mean effects of a pollutant on human health.86 
Such a methodological placeholder ignores synergistic effects and hot spots; 
sub-populations of extra-sensitive persons; and downplays the well-known 
added susceptibility of the children and elderly.87 While gradually this 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the 
Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,140, 21,144, 21,148 (pro-
posed May 6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (discussing the permissibility 
and advantages of subcategorizing industries to provide for higher emission standards for 
some groups of industry and avoid shutdowns that might otherwise result from a single 
emission standard, and citing Judge Williams’s concurrence as endorsement of this  
approach). 
 85. One example is the deeply buried discussion of the authority to subcategorize 
industries to set the standards and the economic advantages to this technique in a court case 
where this practice was challenged. Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“[Although] authority to generate subcategories is obviously not unqualified . . . one legit-
imate basis for creating additional subcategories must be the interest in keeping the relation 
between ‘achieved’ and ‘achievable’ in accord with common sense and the reasonable mean-
ing of the statute.”) (Williams, J., concurring). 
 86. See, e.g., COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT ch. 11 (1994). 
 87. For an illustration in a research study for the importance of these variables, see 
Philip J. Landrigan et al., Pesticides and Inner-City Children: Exposures, Risks, and Prevention, 
107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPPLEMENT 431 (1999) (spotlighting through a research study 
the unaccounted for synergistic effects, high levels of exposure that are unexpected, and 
increased susceptibilities of children, all in a single modest study measuring pesticide exposures 
to children in the inner-city). 
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methodological step is being examined in more detail,88 retrospective  
adjustments may be complicated as a result of the invisible methods.  
In a recent review of the EPA’s formaldehyde risk assessment, the EPA 
was also taken to task for obscuring its major methodological assumptions 
in synthesizing the evidence and reaching key conclusions. Specifically, the 
panel observed that it was difficult to understand the EPA’s assumptions 
and analysis on a number of points.89 Indeed, the panel observed, these  
[p]roblems with clarity and transparency of the methods appear to 
be a repeating theme over the years, even though the documents 
appear to have grown considerably in length. In the roughly 1,000-
page draft reviewed by the present committee, little beyond a brief 
introductory chapter could be found on the methods for conducting 
the assessment.90 
The recommendations of the panel, consistent with our argument, 
urged the EPA to articulate its methods more completely and accessibly.91 
For example, the panel recommended that the EPA should describe 
more fully the methods of the assessment, including a description of 
search strategies used to identify studies with the exclusion and  
inclusion criteria clearly articulated and a better description of the 
outcomes of the searches (a model for displaying the results of litera-
ture searches is provided later in this chapter) and clear descriptions 
of the weight of evidence approaches used for the various noncancer 
outcomes.92 
Even monetizing the impacts of pollutants and other stresses on public 
health and the environment under Executive Order No. 12,866 suffers from 
methodological black boxes.93 A focus on numbers and ultimate bright-line 
determinations of economic impact, without attention to developing an 
explicit discourse about rigorous methods for how these estimates can be 
developed, has led to analyses that appear more geared toward insulating 
the agency from litigation than advancing an understanding of the costs and 
                                                                                                                      
 88. For EPA’s efforts to develop supplemental guidelines for estimating cancer  
susceptibilities early in life, see EPA, PUB. NO. 630/R-03/003F, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE 
FOR ASSESSING SUSCEPTIBILITY FROM EARLY-LIFE EXPOSURE TO CARCINOGENS (2005) 
available at http://www.epa.gov/raf/publications/pdfs/childrens_supplement_final.pdf. 
 89. See COMM. TO REVIEW EPA’S DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT OF FORMALDEHYDE, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S 
DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT OF FORMALDEHYDE ch. 7 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 4. 
 91. Id. at 14, 152. 
 92. Id. at 152. 
 93. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
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benefits of regulation.94 Moreover, with the black-boxing comes unexpected 
surprises once variables appear that are too important to ignore in future 
analyses. An example would be the potentially greater value of children and 
the need to monetize losses to children differently.95 
4. More General Executive Branch Directives Aimed  
at Scientific Integrity and Transparency 
Highlights from some of the leading governmental directives further 
underscore just how pervasive this invisibility of methods is in contempo-
rary regulation. In President Obama’s memorandum and Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) Director John Holdren’s accompanying 
directive on government scientific integrity, the term “method” is never 
mentioned, and the concept of methods as a critical ingredient to ensuring 
both rigor and candor in the agencies’ science discussions is wholly  
ignored.96 Even in the agencies’ own guidelines for improving scientific 
integrity, there is little movement toward making methods more visible or 
rigorous. Agencies instead focus their efforts on shoring up scientific  
misconduct programs (for fraud) or providing staff scientists with access to 
the press.97 While these are important reforms, requiring agencies to identify 
and defend their methods of analysis seems at least as important for ensuring 
the integrity of regulatory science.98  
                                                                                                                      
 94. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Clean Air Interstate Rule’s Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis: Advocacy Dressed up as Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 56, 
56–57 (Richard Morgenstern et al. eds., 2009). 
 95. See, e.g., Sean H. Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 
2013) (discussing how research on the value of children alters the way their losses should be 
calculated, which in turn could lead to considerable revamping of regulatory analyses for past 
and future regulations). 
 96. Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,671 (Mar. 11, 2009); Memo-
randum on Scientific Integrity from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Sci. & 
Tech. and Dir. of the Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies pt. V (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf [hereinafter Holdren, Scientific Integrity Memo]. 
 97. See, e.g., WENDY E. WAGNER, SCIENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: A 
STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 64–78 (draft Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/COR-Science-Project-Report-
2-27-12-CIRCULATED-TO-COMMITTEE.pdf.  
 98. In its revised guidance for agency “risk assessments”, for example, the Office of 
Management and Budget provides no reference to the need for a discussion of competing 
methods of inference, nor does OMB require the agencies to articulate how they synthesized 
the literature or developed their predictive models. See, e.g., Memorandum on Updated 
Principles for Risk Analysis from Susan Dudley, Admin., Office of Info. and Regulatory 
Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and Sharon L. Hays, Assoc. Dir. & Deputy Dir. for 
Sci., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
(Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_ 
matters_pdf/m07-24.pdf. One sentence of the twelve-page memo urges agencies to explicate 
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II. WHY METHODS ARE INVISIBLE 
As the prior section makes clear, the invisibility of methods is not 
unique to the FDA, but can be seen across U.S. regulation. In these regula-
tory settings, moreover, policymakers, courts, and interest groups within the 
regulatory state all tend to focus their arguments and oversight primarily on 
regulatory outputs and/or overarching regulatory frameworks, rather than 
on the agencies’ methods of reaching decisions.  
This Part considers these institutional forces in some detail. Even 
though at its core the regulatory process is preoccupied with the rationality 
of decisions, what can be seen overall is the way in which regulatory pro-
cesses have evolved in ways that make methods of inference invisible in 
regulatory debates.  
A. Conventional Misunderstandings and Methodological Complacency 
Among Lawyers 
One of most significant reasons that methods have been ignored is  
misguided impressions by the legal and policymaking communities that the 
methods of inference used by scientists lie beyond their expertise and thus 
are something to be avoided.99 Thus, while the results of research are viewed 
as fair game for challenge, the way in which those results are generated are 
not. Such a misperception is not surprising. Issues of scientific inference do 
require expertise—a fact that anyone reading Part I would have felt acutely 
aware of—but to avoid these issues for this same reason is badly mistaken. 
Inferring from facts is part of the inherent rationality of a decision,100 and 
the rationality of decision has been a constant theme in the history of the 
development of U.S. risk regulation.101 Indeed, the search for rationality in 
regulation has been the force behind legislative reform,102 executive over-
sight,103 and judicial review.104 Yet the search for rationality, at least within 
existing legal frameworks, stops quite short of considering methods of 
                                                                                                                      
their assumptions, judgments, inferences, and methods. Id. at 11. That is the only mention 
made of the need for agencies to extract their methods, including their methods of inference, 
and to make them explicit and accessible for comment.  
 99. Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 264. 
 100. Id. at 267–70. 
 101. See the analyses in COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR 
POLLUTANTS, supra note 86, at ch. 2, and in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT ch. 2 (2009). 
 102. See infra Part II.B.3.  
 103. See THOMAS MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991). 
 104. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between 
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 227 (1996). 
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inferences.105 While there are inherent challenges in understanding methods 
that lie on the other side of the disciplinary divide,106 this does not mean 
that such methods are not important.  
Second and relatedly, lawyers and policymakers have tended to pre-
sume risk assessment is a scientific method in and of itself, so that 
fundamental questions about how scientific analysis should be carried out 
are hidden from view.107 Discourses about risk assessment have dominated 
risk regulation over the last two decades,108 but there is little appreciation 
that these discourses have primarily been driven by concerns over adminis-
trative legitimacy rather than being explicit discourses about how best to 
infer conclusions from facts.109 Indeed, in much of this discussion, science is 
largely understood as an input into the decisionmaking process that equates 
to the truth,110 a perception that obscures the complexity of methods and 
wrongly assumes that the methods are well established. In fact, in some 
policy circles there is an assumption that these terms are themselves methods. 
They are not, however, and as the National Research Council noted in 1994: 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Prior commentary hovers around the importance of methods, but never lands on 
it squarely. As Judge Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States 
asked in 1976, “[w]hat does, and should, a reviewing court do when it considers a challenge 
to technical administrative decisionmaking?” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,68 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). That question led to a debate between him and Judge Bazelon over the nature of “hard 
look” review. Id. Edley has described Bazelon and Leventhal “as talking about two sides of 
the same coin, that coin being judicial activism motivated by a concern for sound govern-
ance.” CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 227 (1990). 
 106. Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 277–79. 
 107. This concern is raised in reports such as COMM. ON HAZARDOUS RISK OF AIR 
POLLUTANTS, supra note 86, and NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 101. See generally 
Wagner, supra note 25. 
 108. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 101; see also COMM. TO REVIEW THE 
OMB RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF 
THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET (2007); 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
RISK MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT (1997). 
 109. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, The Songlines of Risk, 8 ENVTL. VALUES 135, 137 (1999); 
FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. Indeed, much of this discourse has been driven by a focus on 
outside-in accountability, where the focus has been upon controlling public administration, 
rather than inside-out accountability, which focuses on the methodology inherent within a 
discipline. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the 
Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–66 (2012). The outside-in vision 
of accountability can also be understood as promoting the rational-instrumental paradigm of 
administrative constitutionalism. FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. 
 110. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 17, at part II.A. While we did not elaborate on 
how this misunderstanding also obscures the importance of methods, it is clear from the 
examples we provide that policymakers tend to expect scientists and their processes to 
produce definitive answers to regulatory questions, without bogging the process down in 
discussions about alternative, plausible methods.  
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“Risk assessment is not a single, fixed method of analysis. Rather it is a 
systematic approach to organizing and analyzing scientific knowledge and 
information.”111 As a result, critical decisions regarding methods of infer-
ence and for synthesizing the literature remain black-boxed while lobbyists 
insist that the agency employ “peer review,” utilize “risk assessment,” or 
ensure that their work is based on some form of aspirational “sound science.” 
B. Reinforcing Institutional Incentives 
Given the prevailing misperceptions of methods by the legal and  
policymaking communities, it is no wonder that institutional oversight 
processes tend to tolerate the invisibility of methods. What is perhaps more 
surprising is the tendency of some institutions to actively promote this 
invisibility in how they operate. These institutional problems are discussed 
next. 
1. Science Advisory Committees 
Science advisory committees provide perhaps the single most effective 
survival mechanism for an agency struggling to have its regulatory science 
accepted, and yet the science advisory process can work to keep methodo-
logical discussions out of public view. Rather than ensuring that methods 
are made more visible and subject to broader scrutiny, science advisory 
boards sometimes do nothing more than pass the scientific assessment from 
one black box process inside the agency to another, equally black box  
process involving advisory board review.  
As a matter of orientation, science advisory boards used by the agencies 
are quite variable. Some science advisory boards are required by statutory 
mandate.112 Others are employed by the agency on a program-wide or rule-
specific basis.113 In most cases, agencies use the science advisors to review 
their assessments and proposed rules or standards.114 When they review 
                                                                                                                      
 111. COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, supra note 86, 
at 4 (emphasis added).  
 112. E.g., Clean Air Act § 109(d)(2)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) 
(establishing a seven-member science advisory panel to consult with EPA on its review of 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act). 
 113. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 08-440, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENTS: 
LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS LIMIT THE USEFULNESS 
AND CREDIBILITY OF EPA’S INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM 13 (2008), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/273184.pdf (noting the participation of science advisory 
boards in the review of influential risk assessments under EPA’s Integrated Risk Information 
System (IRIS) program).  
 114. For a richer discussion of how advisory boards do and should operate, see SHEILA 
JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS chs. 5–9 (1990); 
MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1999). 
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agency products, science advisory boards can provide assessments that are 
sometimes one-shot and in other cases are iterative.115 
From the agency’s perspective, science advisory boards offer the promise 
of insulating regulatory projects from broader attack against their scientific 
reliability, and thus agencies may seek out advisors to buffer them from 
these conflicts.116 As such, the agency tends to be less interested in stimulat-
ing open, frank academic debates among colleagues about the available 
methodological approaches and more interested in a yes-or-no consensus on 
the final regulatory decision. Agencies may even choose to design the advi-
sory process to focus the group on their regulatory conclusions rather than 
methodological alternatives. When the task is framed in this way, the science 
advisors will likely comply with their assignment. Methods remain invisible 
and perhaps become even more deeply embedded in the layers of scientific 
review. 
More recent process reforms of science advisory boards may exacerbate 
this black-boxing of methods even further. The White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), for example, prescribes mandatory  
external peer review for influential rules, yet the OMB’s detailed guidance 
says little to nothing about the need for expert review of the agencies’  
underlying methods.117 The apparent expectation is that an expert group 
will endorse or reject the agency’s ultimate findings, rather than engage the 
agency in a dialogue about its choice and explication of methods and identify 
room for improvement. Most of the current regulatory commotion about 
the reform of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and advisory 
board review is similarly focused on the selection of experts to serve on 
panels rather than ensuring that it is designed in ways that extract methods 
for larger expert and public review.118 
                                                                                                                      
 115. See JASANOFF, supra note 114; POWELL, supra note 114 . Generally, science advisory 
boards provide one-shot opinions on agency regulatory products. The EPA’s advisory board 
(CASAC), which is consulted on EPA’s review of various National Ambient Air Quality 
standards, is an exception to this rule. CASAC weighs in multiple times on each of EPA’s 
scientific reports that supports a final revised standard. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
INTEGRATED REVIEW PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
PARTICULATE MATTER 25, fig.4.1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/standards/ 
pm/data/2008_03_final_integrated_review_plan.pdf (identifying CASAC’s involvement in 
EPA’s review process). 
 116. See generally JASANOFF, supra note 114. 
 117. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL 
INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW (2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf. 
 118. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., IMPROVING THE USE OF SCIENCE IN 
REGULATORY POLICY 15–16, 41–42 (2009) (providing some of the most complete recom-
mendations for the reform of science advisory boards, but dedicating very little of the 
proposals to the need for agencies to make their methods more accessible and explicit for 
this review). 
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2. Judicial Review 
Since courts provide an external check on the agency to ensure that 
they have followed the requisite processes and explained their choices,119 the 
courts would seem the natural institutional check to ensure that methods 
have become visible in regulatory processes. The courts are where two of 
the most significant standards of review—the “arbitrary and capricious” and 
“substantial evidence” standards—are directly concerned with the rationality 
of decisionmaking.120  
Courts do require that agencies explain their decisions, and sometimes 
this explanation can lead to stays in a rulemaking until the court is satis-
fied.121 Courts also have power over agencies that softer political processes 
and interest group criticism lack. Thus, courts can provide a valuable lever 
to force agencies to make methods visible. 
Courts, however, have managed to provide institutional oversight in a 
way that often ignores the need to force the agency to expose and explain 
its underlying methodological choices.122 Thus, for example, in applying the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,123 the court tends to examine 
an appellant’s version of the “best available” facts and compare those facts 
to those used by the agency.124 In analyzing facts, the focus tends to be upon 
issues of quantification and the use of assumptions rather than upon the 
choice of methods. Thus, writing for the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 120. Id. Note, however, that in the risk regulation field many statutes set out their own 
standards of review. E.g., Clean Air Act § 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006); Toxic 
Substances Control Act § 19(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B) (2006); Occupational 
Safety & Health Act §§ 6(f), 11(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(f), 660(a) (2006). How these standards 
operate is complex. See Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899, 933–40 (1973); Elizabeth Fisher, The Risks of 
Quantifying Justice: The Use of the Substantial Evidence Test in Judicial Review of OSHA Rule-
Making, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY, RISKS AND LEGAL PROCESSES 293, 297–306 (Robert 
Baldwin ed., 1997) (explaining that “substantial evidence” was originally an adjudicative 
concept, but in the OSHA context came to be defined in scientific terms). 
 121. See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 738, 778–79 (2011) (discussing how 
courts seek explanations in their remands of rulemakings). 
 122. It should be added that these generalizations about judicial review are just that; 
there appears to be some, possibly considerable, variation around this mean. For a recent 
case that emphasizes and reviews methods as opposed to outputs, see Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 122–23 (2012) (per curiam). Whether this latest case 
signals a shift in the courts’ understanding and focus in their review of agency science 
remains an open question, however. 
 123. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 124. Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of 
Environmental Modeling, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10751, 10765–68 (2003) (discussing some of the 
litigation against EPA that makes this argument in the context of computational models). 
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Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Insurance Co., Justice Byron White 
stressed the need for an agency to “examine the relevant data and articulate 
a satisfactory explanation.”125 But while there is a resultant need to establish 
a “rational connection” between the facts and the choices made, this rational 
connection is not understood in terms of methods. Rather, it is more under-
stood in terms of the factors taken into account; the plausibility of the 
decision depends on whether it is understood to be “a product of agency 
expertise.”126 Accordingly, the agency’s methods are relevant only to the 
extent those methods invisibly support one body of evidence versus another.  
Second, and reinforcing the judicial focus on “outputs,” the courts seem 
to defer more heavily to agency outputs that have been reviewed and  
endorsed by science advisory panels.127 By crediting this review as a plus in 
assessing the “arbitrariness” of the agency’s finding, judicial review again 
reinforces the black-boxing of methods through advisory review. Methods 
become even more obscure and irrelevant to the test for rigorous regulatory 
science. 
Third and finally, some have observed that the courts seem more defer-
ential to technical “facts” than to candid discussions about competing 
assumptions and models.128 Courts defer heavily to issues that are “on the 
frontiers of science,”129 for example, yet when agencies concede that they 
faced policy-loaded choices in their methods, the courts sometimes scruti-
nize these contested decisions more rigorously. Furthermore, the focus is 
often upon agencies quantifying their decisions rather than explaining their 
methods.130 As a result, agencies may rightly perceive that when they 
acknowledge their choices and decisions on method, they may find the 
courts more, rather than less, inclined to take a “hard look” and reverse 
decisions with which they disagree. 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 126. Id. 
 127. This observation is at this point only an aesthetic observation based on some 
highly salient cases. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); see also infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text. 
 128. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity 
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
300, 311 (bemoaning the willingness of the court to reverse agency policy choices when they 
are exposed). 
 129. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 
87, 103 (1983) (“When examining this kind of scientific determination [i.e., one at the 
“frontiers of scientific knowledge”], as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court 
must generally be at its most deferential.”); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 
F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (deferring to agency decisions on frontiers of scientific 
knowledge), vacated in part, appeal dismissed in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 130. See Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
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Much of this situation is understandable and a natural response on the 
part of judges to the scientific content of decisions.131 Science is not in their 
area of expertise and the scope of review is limited.132 It is also perhaps due 
to the historical focus in administrative rulemaking upon the significance of 
a decisionmaker establishing a “rulemaking record.” In the risk regulation 
context, courts have interpreted that administrative record as a purely factual 
one.133 It is also the case that doctrines such as hard look review were 
adapted from more generic areas where issues of scientific method were less 
relevant.134 Yet that does not detract from the fact that choices over method 
are not only inherent in the rationality of regulatory decisionmaking pro-
cesses but also central to the question of how rational those processes are. 
3. The Larger Regulatory Process 
Agencies are not only bound by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and judicial review, but are also constrained by their authorizing 
statutes and a growing list of supplemental regulatory assessment require-
ments.135 The invisibility of methods is thus not simply an agency creation 
or a result of judicial permissiveness, but in part, and in some cases in large 
part, attributable to legislative design. As a statutory matter, for example, 
Congress can lock the agency into a particular method, as it did with the 
FDA.136 Simply by prescribing specific rulemaking requirements, methods 
become beside the point and fade into the background. While the FDA’s 
drug program offers an illustrative example of this type of hard constraint, 
it is not alone. Under some authorizing statutes, for example, agencies are 
precluded from adopting a number of inferential approaches by statute.137 
While this more limited discretion in some cases appears to make the agency’s 
life easier, the narrow delegations alter the agency’s methodological choices 
                                                                                                                      
 131. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511–12 (1974). 
 132. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 133. See Fisher, supra note 120, at 299. 
 134. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
40–46 (1983) (concerning the rescinding of a seat belt regulation); Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 135. For a recent inventory of some of the more significant requirements imposed on 
agencies, see CURTIS W. COPELAND, REGULATORY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS: A REVIEW 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 13–32 (2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/ 
sites/default/files/COR-Final-Reg-Analysis-Report-for-5-3-12-Mtg.pdf. 
 136. See supra Part I.B. 
 137. The NAAQS reviews discussed infra Part III.B provide a good example of this 
more limited statutory delegation. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 
485 (2001) (interpreting the Clean Air Act to limit the discretion afforded the Administrator to 
consider economic consequences of health protective standards). 
Wagner_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013  4:28 PM 
Spring 2013] Making Method Visible 459 
 
and how it can communicate them.138 Congress can also lock into place 
methods for synthesizing the literature, as illustrated by the competing 
approaches to pesticide evaluation taken by the FWS and the EPA.139 
Additionally, both by statute and executive order, agencies must evaluate 
the impacts of their future rules on a range of targets such as small busi-
nesses,140 the general economy,141 minority communities,142 etc.143 Agencies 
must also be prepared to defend or subject technical information to an 
appeal process when their “facts” are challenged under the Data Quality 
Act.144 Each of these accountability mechanisms demand “outputs”—with 
an expectation of considerable precision—that indicate whether the rule will 
impact small businesses or present an undue hardship on the economy 
relative to the regulatory benefits.145 The programs do not even gesture 
toward the need for disclosure and explication of methods; rather they 
direct agencies to provide barometer-like readings on how the rules affect 
various, often conflicting features of American life. 
The result of these regulatory accountability tools, again, is to focus the 
agencies on presenting answers without developing or explaining their 
methods. Competing methods for determining economic harms or consider-
ing the ways that rules might have adverse impacts on communities are 
wholly ignored. Such a blind spot is particularly ironic given the objective of 
these good government tools, which is to advance government accountability. 
III. HOW TO CONSIDER METHODS 
It is one thing to note that methods are invisible, but it is quite another 
to imagine how the regulatory discussions would look if methods were more 
centrally discussed in agency rulemakings. This is particularly difficult 
when there are fundamental intellectual challenges involved in evaluating 
methods in another discipline, particularly in circumstances of technical, 
                                                                                                                      
 138. See Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in 
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1266–74 (2004) (criticizing the Clean Air Act 
for an unrealistically narrow delegation). 
 139. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 140. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006). 
 141. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 142. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 895 (1995), reprinted as amended in 
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 143. See generally COPELAND, supra note 135 (discussing the most taxing requirements). 
 144. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000). 
 145. One need only review the final sections of any proposed and final regulations for 
this checklist of applicable laws. See also COPELAND, supra note 135, at App. 2 (summarizing 
the requirements cited in 100 rules). 
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institutional, and political complexity.146 Given the foundational role of 
methods in synthesizing scientific research to inform regulation, however, 
these challenges simply cannot be brushed aside or avoided. Methods are 
endemic in regulatory decisions and must be identified and confronted 
head-on. 
There is no room here to enter into a detailed analysis of these issues. 
Our purpose here is to put the issue on the agenda for discussion. To begin 
the conversation, we offer some suggestions for what the regulatory discus-
sion might look like if methods were made part of the regulatory 
discussions. The FDA experience with Vioxx demonstrates the importance 
of making methodological techniques accessible to policymakers, and the 
2007 FDA legislation passed in response represents an important, corrective 
step that advances this recognition of the spectrum of inferential methods 
sketched in Figure 1, supra.147 To provide additional illustrations of how 
agencies are making methods visible, we consider the Department of  
Interior’s (DOI) use of probabilistic inference to justify its decision to 
classify polar bears as a threatened species under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA). We also explore the EPA’s staged approach to making methods 
visible in its regulation of air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. The  
section then closes with some preliminary thoughts about how the courts’ 
approach to judicial review might be adjusted to provide greater encour-
agement for agencies to place methodological discussions centrally in their 
regulatory analyses and discussions.  
Although there is considerable variation within different regulatory  
settings, some basic themes and principles emerge from this inventory of 
success stories. The examples in this section illustrate how the agency can 
explain its choice of inferential methods and how it can even identify how 
those methods suit the question at hand.  
A. Department of Interior’s Use of Probabilistic Inference 
The DOI’s decision to protect polar bears offers a concrete illustration 
of how agencies can articulate alternate methods of inference. Recall the 
discussion of one method of inference, p-value, in Part I supra. In their 
regulatory analysis of polar bears, the DOI employed a second type of 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 279–82. 
 147. Note since the inferential methods generally run across entire programs or multiple 
programs, they may only need to be made explicit once and can be referenced after that. 
Thus the investment of energy and time in these meta-methodological decisions, which are 
also the most consequential, may not be substantial when parsed out over a number of 
regulatory projects. 
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Under the ESA, the DOI must identify endangered and threatened 
species in need of protection.149 The former are in danger of extinction, 
while the latter are likely to be so within the foreseeable future.150 The DOI 
must make these determinations based on the best scientific and commer-
cial data available to establish at least one of five factors: (1) present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of habitat; (2) overuse 
for commercial, recreational, scientific or educational purposes; (3) disease 
or predation; (4) inadequacy of existing regulations; or (5) other factors 
affecting continued existence.151  
Among the methods the DOI used to synthesize and integrate the  
scientific data on hand—thereby establishing the weight of evidence for the 
polar bear’s threatened existence—was a computational model based on 
Bayesian inference. Given the method’s underlying logic, the Bayesian 
model served as a transparent tool to integrate multiple strands of evidence 
into one cohesive system. The model (see Figure 5) consisted of three  
components: 
Nodes represent the causes and intermediary effects influencing polar 
bear population. Note that the shaded boxes correspond to four 
of the five ESA factors listed above. 
Arrows link these nodes in a causal chain of events.  
Probability distributions determine how the state of one node affects 
the other nodes in the system.  
Taken together, these three components summarized the evidential  
narrative underlying the DOI’s regulatory decision. This model then served 
as a formal means to integrate empirical data, expert judgment, model 
results, and other information within the DOI’s assembled body of science. 
Some of these evidential components were individual studies in which 
evidence was evaluated by using p-values. The DOI’s model therefore 
serves as an example of how multiple inferential methods may be used 
concurrently to evaluate the overall weight of evidence. 
                                                                                                                      
 149. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2006). 
 150. Id. § 1532(6), (20). 
 151. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E).  
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FIGURE 5. BAYESIAN MODEL OF INTERIOR’S DECISION TO LIST 
POLAR BEAR AS A THREATENED SPECIES 
DOI’s model, based on Bayesian inference, has three components: nodes represent the system’s major 
factors; arrows show the direction of causation; and probability distributions determine system behavior. 
The shaded nodes are those which DOI must consider under its statutory mandate. 
 
Based partially on this model’s results, the DOI in 2008 listed the polar 
bear as a threatened species.152 Shortly thereafter, numerous plaintiffs  
challenged the agency’s decision in court.153 One group claimed the animal 
merited greater protection as an endangered species, while the other 
claimed that the DOI should not have listed the animal at all. Both groups 
argued that the DOI had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of 
the APA.154 
In its opinion, the district court acknowledged its narrow standard of 
review under the APA and the deference it owed to the agency, particularly 
for a regulatory decision requiring a high level of technical expertise.155 But 
the court also emphasized its duty to hold the DOI to standards of rational-
ity.156 Following this path, the court scrutinized the agency’s decision and 
                                                                                                                      
 152. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened 
Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 
28,274 (May 15, 2008)(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 153. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. 
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2011), aff ’d, Nos. 11–5219, 11–5221, 11–5222, 11–5223, 2013 WL 765059 
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 1, 2013). 
 154. Id. at 78. 
 155. Id. at 80. 
 156. The court noted that it would remand the agency’s rule if the agency “relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an  
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference 
Wagner_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013  4:28 PM 
464 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
upheld the DOI’s decision. In the course of its affirmance, the court  
discussed the inferential challenges that lay before the DOI’s decisionmakers, 
who needed 
not only to evaluate a body of science that is both exceedingly 
complex and rapidly developing, but also to apply that science in a 
way that enabled them to make reasonable predictions about poten-
tial impacts over the next century to a species that spans 
international boundaries. [They] considered over 160,000 pages of 
documents and approximately 670,000 comment submissions from 
state and federal agencies, foreign governments, Alaska Native 
Tribes and tribal organizations, federal commissions, local govern-
ments, commercial and trade organizations, conservation 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens. 
[They] also consulted a number of impartial experts in a variety of 
fields, including climate scientists and polar bear biologists.157 
As In re Polar Bear reveals, interest groups did take issue with the 
DOI’s model, but the developers of DOI’s model provided measures of 
performance—based on model likelihoods, along with other techniques of 
model evaluation—to demonstrate the model’s consistency with the evidence. 
By clearly delineating its understanding of the system of factors affecting 
polar bear populations and by declaring its judgment of the probable states 
of these factors, the DOI made its method visible in such a way that helped 
to focus discussion on the scientific merits and the appropriateness of its 
choice of inferences. The visible methods properly refocused the debate on 
the evidence and inferential choices rather than on the black-boxed result 
(i.e., in favor or against classifying the polar bear as threatened) over which 
the litigants disagreed.158 The DOI conceded that the model was only pre-
liminary, that it was only one aspect of the evidence, and that it contained 
many uncertainties.159 However, regardless of its results, the model helped 
confirm other evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of the effects 
of multiple stressors on polar bears.  
The DOI’s Bayesian model was just one of several strands of evidence 
used to justify the agency’s decision. Our focus on this model is intended to 
emphasize how a variety of inferential methods can provide considerable 
evidentiary illumination in settings where the available evidence is broadly 
scattered and incomplete. As the court stated, the DOI did not rely on 
                                                                                                                      
in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 157. Id. at 68–69. 
 158. See Pascual, supra note 25. 
 159. In re Polar Bear Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 107. 
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existing data to establish statistically significant declines in polar bear popu-
lations. To justify its decision to list the species as threatened, the agency 
used models to predict significant future declines.160 As we describe in  
Figure 5 and the accompanying text, for one of its models, the agency used 
Bayesian inference to communicate, in transparent and visible terms, the 
probabilistic underpinnings of its model, as well as the analytical founda-
tions of the model.161 The joint plaintiffs did not contest the agency’s choice 
of models, only the manner in which they were applied.162 The challenge 
from the joint plaintiffs therefore amounted to disagreements with the 
agency’s judgments regarding the severity of climate change and of its 
effects on polar bear habitats and therefore, on their populations. Given the 
rational relationship between the agency’s models and the reality they were 
purported to represent,163 none of these disagreements compelled the court 
to abandon its deference to the agency in “an area characterized by scientific 
and technological uncertainty . . . .”164 
B. EPA’s Synthesis of Scientific Information on Air Pollutants 
Our next example takes a step back and highlights how in at least one 
program—the EPA’s setting of air quality standards—the agency not only 
deploys multiple methods for inference and analysis, but has actually  
institutionalized a process to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, 
methods are made visible.  
As detailed in Section I, it is rarely the case that the weight of scientific 
evidence on human health and environmental risk will rest on the results of 
a single study. Typically, various strands of data, collected from multiple 
science investigations, will have to be woven together to reach an inference. 
And just as the multiple methods outlined in Figure 1 can be used to draw 
inferences from the data in a single study, so too can these multiple methods 
be used to integrate information from across multiple studies. Indeed, the 
model for polar bear populations described in the previous section was the 
DOI’s attempt to use Bayesian inference to computationally integrate  
disparate information. 
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must establish standards for ambient 
air concentrations of pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.”165 The EPA must revisit these so-called 
                                                                                                                      
 160. Id. at 109. 
 161. For complete details, see STEVEN C. ARMSTRUP ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 
FORECASTING THE RANGE-WIDE STATUS OF POLAR BEARS AT SELECTED TIMES IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 12–19 (2007). 
 162. In re Polar Bear Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 108 n.51. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 108 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
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National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at least once every five 
years.166 In doing so, it must consult with an independent, scientific  
committee—the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC).167 
Although not statutorily required to so, as a matter of course, the EPA 
prepares reports to document the methods and the rationale it uses to  
integrate the scientific information culled to justify the agency’s air  
regulations.168 In these reports, the EPA divides the analytical project into 
distinct steps that allow it to better articulate its methods of analysis.169 
First, the EPA crystalizes the policy questions. In a second report, the EPA 
then assembles and synthesizes the relevant scientific literature that has 
bearing on those policy questions. In a third report, the EPA applies a 
variety of alternative models to the available scientific literature to reach 
predictions about air quality and public health impacts. The EPA concludes 
the exercise with a report that explains for sophisticated policymakers the 
key methodological steps that it used in the analysis, the range of conclusions 
and uncertainties surrounding different possible standards, and highlights 
research questions for the future. 
Two recent legal challenges to the EPA’s NAAQS—one for nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) and another for particulate matter (PM2.5)—illuminate the 
EPA’s institutionalized process for transparently integrating various methods 
into its scientific inferences. In 2005, the EPA began to consider epidemio-
logical and clinical evidence suggesting that respiratory illnesses were 
occurring at lower NO2 concentrations and at shorter durations of exposure 
than had previously been thought. The EPA published a call for infor-
mation in the Federal Register,170 and in 2007, issued a research plan in which 
it discussed the major science issues to be addressed, the methods it would 
use, and its intent to present its results before the CASAC.171 In 2008, the 
agency published its assessment of the science.172 The CASAC agreed with 
                                                                                                                      
 166. Id. § 7409(d)(1). 
 167. See id. § 7409(d)(2)(A)–(B). 
 168. See Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/review.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012). Each criteria air 
pollutant is listed on the left bar. By clicking the pollutant, one can view the various reports 
that have been issued.  
 169. See, e.g., NAAQS PROCESS REVIEW WORKGROUP, EPA, REVIEW OF THE 
PROCESS FOR SETTING NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS E-1 (2006) available 
at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/pdfs/naaqs_process_report_march2006.pdf. 
 170. Call for Information, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,236 (Dec. 9, 2005). 
 171. EPA posted all of these planning documents on its website at Nitrogen Dioxide 
(NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in 2010—Planning Documents, 
U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/nox/s_nox_cr_pd.html (last updated 
Dec. 10, 2012). 
 172. The EPA’s various drafts of its integrated science assessment are posted at Nitro-
gen Dioxide (NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in 2010—Integrated 
Science Assessments, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/nox/s_nox_cr_ 
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the EPA’s assessment. The EPA proposed new NAAQS in 2009 and  
published its final rule in 2010.173 It bears highlighting that this entire  
process involved notification in the Federal Register, multiple rounds of 
public comment, and publication of the various science documents on the 
web. 
In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,174 the petitioners claimed that 
this NO2 standard was arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the 
EPA misconstrued the scientific evidence and relied on non-peer reviewed 
materials. The court concluded that on every alleged breach of scientific 
judgment—i.e., that EPA ignored countervailing evidence regarding NO2’s 
effect on respiratory illness; that it misused an epidemiology study; and 
that it based the projections of the rule’s benefits on faulty assumptions—
the agency provided a reasoned defense of its inferences. The court  
stated that “[p]erhaps the [petitioners themselves] should have had [their] 
brief peer-reviewed.”175 
On the other hand, in American Farm Bureau v. EPA,176 the court ruled 
that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in failing to explain adequately 
why it did not consider certain scientific evidence that supported a more 
stringent NAAQS for fine particulate matter.177 Just as it did when  
developing the NO2 standard in the preceding paragraph, the EPA issued 
the standard for PM2.5 after a process that entailed both the crafting of 
reports to summarize the science behind the proposed NAAQS for PM2.5, 
as well as consultations with the CASAC.178 The EPA’s political manage-
ment, however, rejected the ultimate recommendations emerging from the 
five-year scientific process and decided that the high costs of the standard, 
                                                                                                                      
isi.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012), and its drafts of the risk and policy assessments are 
posted at Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in 
2010—Risk and Exposure Assessments, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/ 
nox/s_nox_cr_rea.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012). 
 173. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Nitrogen Dioxide, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 34,404 (proposed July 15, 2009); Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for 
Nitrogen Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,474 (Feb. 9, 2010)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58). 
 174. Am. Petroleum Inst. & Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 1342 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
 175. Id. at 1348. 
 176. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 177. Id. at 522. Fine particulate matter, or PM2.5, consists primarily of soot particles 
with diameter less than 2.5 nanometers. This air pollutant is linked to higher levels of 
mortality and morbidity. See Particulate Matter, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/particlepollution/ 
(last updated Jan. 23, 2013). 
 178. For an inventory of the various documents and drafts on EPA’s particulate 
NAAQS review, as well as the comments and EPA’s responses, see Particulate Matter (PM) 
Standards, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/s_pm_index.html (last updated 
Dec. 20, 2012). 
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coupled with evidentiary uncertainties, favored a less stringent standard.179 
In reversing this final standard, the court compared it with the range of 
plausible standards developed through the EPA’s institutionalized scientific 
process, which provided a transparent and rigorously reviewed discussion of 
methods and accompanying uncertainties.180 The court concluded that when 
set against this robust scientific record, the EPA’s different final standard 
lacked a rational basis.181 
Both the polar bear and the EPA’s PM2.5 case illustrate that, once 
methods are made visible, the agency’s ultimate conclusion rests on a more 
solid foundation. Rather than being vulnerable to tangential nitpicking, the 
articulation of methods provides support for standards that are the result of 
multiple inferences, none of which can be firmly grounded in existing scien-
tific knowledge. This is not to say that decisions will not be criticized or 
that they will not be subject to challenge. Rather, the focus of criticisms and 
challenges will be on the methods that are fundamental to the decision. 
Again, to draw on our legal analogy, within legal scholarship we understand 
the distinction between legitimate and irrelevant grounds of criticism in 
relation to judgments. In the case of the EPA’s rules, moreover, the ability 
of the EPA to point to this type of careful explication of its methods is a 
relatively new and welcome innovation. The EPA only recently revised its 
NAAQS process, and prior to this renovation, the EPA’s NAAQS process 
suffered from the same invisibility of methods—and the accompanying 
litigation, political controversy, and related strife—as most other agency 
protective standards. The NAAQS process thus offers a valuable before-
and-after portrait of the institutional attributes of visible methods.  
C. Encouraging Visible Methods by Adjusting Judicial Review 
Because the EPA’s revised NAAQS process in large part resulted from 
consistent, strong pressure from the courts and litigation, we close this 
Section by considering ways that judicial review and court directives might 
be used to affect a gradual shift away from existing incentives that tend to 
reward the invisibility of methods. The role of the courts is important. 
Indeed, judicial review of an agency decision is essentially the tail that wags 
the regulatory dog; the EPA’s treatment of scientific evidence occurs in 
expectation that the evidence will be the subject of considerable scrutiny in 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Juliet Eilperin, Proposed Standards for Air Quality Criticized, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 
2005, at A10 (describing the Bush Administration EPA’s decision to reject a more stringent 
particulate standard despite strong scientific evidence, including CASAC endorsement, in 
its favor). 
 180. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 559 F.3d at 520–24. 
 181. Id. 
Wagner_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013  4:28 PM 
Spring 2013] Making Method Visible 469 
 
the courtroom.182 The courts therefore exert considerable influence in  
compelling agencies to make their inferential methods visible and to ensure 
that these visible methods conform to the APA’s mandate for rational  
governance. 
Given the ad hoc and context-specific nature of their task, it has not 
been easy for courts to evaluate whether the inferential link between data 
and inference tips the scale to a point where the weight of evidence sup-
ports an agency’s claim of a rational basis.183 Instead, given these challenges, 
it has been easier for courts to effectively abrogate their responsibilities 
under the APA and simply defer to agencies.184 As the court in In re Polar 
Bear noted, however, while judicial review of regulatory science is narrow, 
when conducting this review, courts should be able to understand what the 
agency’s methods of inference were and why the agency deemed them  
appropriate to the task at hand.185 Without such a basic explanation, the legal 
community lacks a principled basis for evaluating regulatory science.  
Under our proposal, the courts should compel the visibility of methods 
by ensuring that the agencies provide answers to two deceptively simple 
questions: (1) Have the agency’s methods of inference been identified? and 
(2) Does the agency explain how its methods are appropriate to the information on 
hand and how they support the ultimate inference used by the agency? Unless an 
agency can respond to both these questions in the affirmative, then the 
agency’s science-based decisions should risk reversal or remand by the 
courts. Courts already require an “explanation” of the agency’s choices.186 
Our proposal requires that the agency describe how it drew its inferences 
and identify the specific assumptions it made in the course of assembling 
the scientific evidence. 
For example, because the FDA persisted in using p-values and random-
ized, clinical trials to evaluate Vioxx even when evidence indicated variable 
response to Vioxx within a heterogeneous population, the answer to both 
questions would have been a resounding “no.”187 Because the DOI explained 
how it used and decided upon the underlying probabilities and how it eval-
uated its model to estimate polar bear population, the court could answer 
both questions in the affirmative.188 The EPA’s detailed explication of its 
                                                                                                                      
 182. The statement is based on the primary author’s personal observation based on 
almost twenty years of experience working on regulatory science.  
 183. See Pascual, supra note 25; Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, 
Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ELR 10371 (Apr. 
2001). 
 184. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 183. 
 185. See 794 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 186. See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 121, at 738, 778–79 (discussing how the courts tend to 
require explanations from the agency regarding its science-based decisions). 
 187. See supra Part I.B. 
 188. See supra, Part III.A. 
Wagner_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013  4:28 PM 
470 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
methods of analysis, embodied in a succession of reports each of which was 
subject to expert review and public comment, provided a solid bottom to a 
final nitrogen dioxide standard that emerged from that process. This same 
institutionalized process also spotlighted the lack of support for a PM2.5 
standard that diverged from agency staff and peer reviewer recommendations.  
Under this proposal, once the agency believes that it can stand by its 
methods and respond affirmatively to these two questions, the burden 
should shift to those who would challenge the agency’s scientific conclu-
sions. Challengers currently gain credit by launching critiques against the 
agency’s findings that highlight missed studies or data, flawed assumptions, 
or unaccounted for differences between the agency’s model and the real 
world.189 In most cases, participants are not required to show how their 
preferred variables, studies, or assumptions serve as a definitive improve-
ment over the agency’s version. The courts should require challengers to 
demonstrate that their methods mark a decided improvement over the 
agencies’ approach. 
Rather than positioning the challengers in a way that encourages sand-
bagging and second-guessing, under this proposal the challengers serve as 
constructive contributors to the development of more robust methods. 
Moreover, since challengers must give the agency notice of their criticisms 
in the comments, the agency will have the benefit of alternative methods 
during notice and comment and can account for innovations and other 
salient arguments earlier in the process. 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s political climate, the terms “sound science” and “junk  
science” are bandied about by both ends of the political spectrum to  
advance their own regulatory agenda. Lost in the cacophony over scientific 
evidence is the cautionary statement offered by the scientist Werner  
Heisenberg: “[W]hat we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to 
our method of questioning.”190 We do not argue for some form of positivism 
or for a naïve search for objectivity. Rather, we contend that agencies make 
their “methods of questioning” visible so that courts can determine “the 
                                                                                                                      
 189. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 594 
(5th ed. 2010) (“If a comment criticizes in detail some characteristic of the agency’s pro-
posed rule, and the agency retains that characteristic in the final rule without including in its 
statement of basis and purpose a relatively detailed response to that criticism, a reviewing 
court is likely to hold the rule unlawful . . . .”). 
 190. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN 
SCIENCE 26 (1958). 
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crucial difference between what is well or badly constructed, well or badly 
composed.”191 
Making methods visible is only the first of several analytical steps—the 
methods also must be robust and appropriate for the analysis at hand.192 Yet 
until this first step is taken, we can only stab in the dark and imagine what 
inferential methods and analytical assumptions the agency might have 
employed. As this article details, agencies can do better. Methods can be 
made visible. And when they are, the discussion lays the essential foundation 
for ensuring a more productive approach to using science for regulation. 
                                                                                                                      
 191. Latour, supra note 70, at 474 (emphasis omitted)(arguing for a ‘compositionist 
manifesto’ in which scholarship moves beyond simple critique). We recognize that culture 
will shape the answer to this question. See Sheila Jasanoff, A New Climate For Society, 27 
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 233 (2010). 
 192. We are not blind to the fact that a “cook-book” approach to inference would lead 
to more definite legal outcomes. Courts could insist that statistical significance—based on 
the method of p-values, as applied to the results of controlled, randomized trials—is the best 
and only way to substantiate the weight of evidence. To do so would be a legal fiction that 
contravenes scientific thinking. See J. Worrall, Causality in Medicine: Getting Back to the Hill 
Top, 53 PREVENTIVE MED. 235 (2011). To do so would perpetuate an irrational approach to 
rationality. We are similarly aware that a pluralistic approach to inferential methods has 
profound and far-reaching consequences on how the legal community understands causation. 
See R. Scheines, Causation, Truth, and the Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2007). We look 
forward to addressing these complications in future work. 
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